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Abstract
The 2008 election rekindled debate about whether US multinationals shift technology across borders and relocate 
production in ways that might harm workers and communities at home. President Obama now pledges to end tax breaks 
for corporations that ship jobs overseas.
The preoccupation about the behavior of American multinationals takes three forms: (1) that US-based multinational 
corporations may follow a strategy that leads them to abandon the home economy, leaving the workers and communities to 
cope on their own with few appealing alternatives after the multinationals have left; (2) worse, that US-based multinational 
corporations may not just abandon home sites but drain off capital, substitute production abroad for exports, and 
“hollow out” the domestic economy in a zero-sum process that damages those left behind; and (3) worst, that US-based 
multinational corporations may deploy a rent-gathering apparatus that switches from sharing supranormal profits and 
externalities with US workers and communities to extracting rents from the United States. Each of these concerns contains 
a hypothetical outcome that can be compared with contemporary evidence from the United States and other home 
countries. 
This working paper shows that multinational corporations do not locate their operations in a zero-sum manner that 
favors host economies at the expense of the home economy. The two-way flow of inward and outward investment 
does not create an outcome that can be reasonably characterized as “hollowing out” the home economy. The evidence 
consistently shows that the expansion of MNC operations abroad and the strengthening of MNC operations in the 
home country are complementary, and the answer to the counterfactual—would the home country be better off, or 
would workers in the home country be better off, if home-country MNCs were prevented from engaging in outward 
investment?—is indisputably negative.
Making it more difficult to engage in outward investment would not strengthen the home economy in the United 
States. Quite the contrary, placing obstacles in the way of US multinationals using the United States as the center for 
conducting their global operations would leave them, their suppliers, their workers, and the communities where they are 
located worse off and less competitive in the world economy.
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IntroductIon
The 2008 US presidential campaign rekindled old controversy about the consequences for the US 
economy of US multinational corporations (MNCs) spreading technology and repositioning production 
around the globe. Now in office, President Obama has pledged that his administration will end tax breaks 
for corporations that ship jobs overseas. Nobel laureate Paul Samuelson’s (2004) critique of whether 
trade liberalization always confers net positive benefits on all trading partners and Lawrence Summers’s 
suggestions that the economic success of developing countries, particularly China, might be damaging 
to US interests, particularly to US workers, have added sophisticated new dimensions to the debate.1 
“Historically, US workers used to have kind of a de facto monopoly access to the US’s superlative capital 
and know-how (scientific, engineering and managerial). All of us Yankees, so to speak, were born with 
silver spoons in our mouths,” declared Samuelson (2004). Are US multinationals taking away those silver 
spoons and delivering them to non-Yankees in a manner that leaves workers, firms, and communities 
in the United States less well off? Does the globalization of industry via foreign direct investment (FDI) 
come at the expense of US economic interests, or does it complement and strengthen the US economy?
three testAble ProPosItIons About the GlobAlIzAtIon of Industry vIA foreIGn 
dIrect Investment 
Answering the questions posed by Samuelson and Summers about whether US multinationals shift 
technology across borders in ways that harm workers and communities in the United States requires a 
fresh examination of how the globalization of industry via FDI takes place. Economic history, according 
to Samuelson (2004), is replete with examples of a nation or a region suffering a permanent measurable 
loss in per capita real income from the “adverse headwind” generated from low-wage competitors and 
technical imitators. Samuelson’s concern that the United States may suffer permanently lower per capita 
real income due to the globalization of trade and investment rests upon two formal assessments: first, 
an assessment of whether the United States continues to enjoy positive gains from trade; and second, 
an assessment of whether the United States has begun to suffer unfavorable terms of trade. These 
two assessments require examining whether consumers and producers continue to reap benefits from 
specialization, division of labor, and economies of scale as globalization proceeds, as well as investigating 
the relative prices of US exports versus US imports to determine whether the United States must generate 
higher levels of exports to pay for a given level of imports.
The formal models needed to make these assessments draw on traditional trade theory, in which 
the location of production is determined by relative costs that are a function of the natural endowments 
1. Lawrence Summers, “America needs to make a new case for trade,” Financial Times, April 27, 2008, and “A 
strategy to promote healthy globalisation,” Financial Times, May 4, 2008. 
of countries around the world. Exogenous changes in technology add a dynamic dimension to how the 
global structure of production might evolve. But traditional trade theory does not adequately encompass 
multinational corporate investment: MNCs operate according to a centralized strategy in imperfectly 
competitive markets, creating technology (including management, quality-control, and marketing 
procedures) that the headquarters can then deploy at home or abroad with some margin of choice about 
where to locate specific activities and how to integrate the stages of production. Therefore, standing apart 
from a formal assessment of trade effects and tests of whether the United States continues to enjoy gains 
from trade and favorable terms of trade is a separate concern about the consequences of the behavior 
of MNCs in the contemporary period. Preoccupation with MNCs’ transfer of technology and their 
placement of production pervades Samuelson’s critique and reappears in Summers’s commentary. This 
preoccupation takes three forms: (1) that US multinationals may follow a strategy that leads them to 
abandon the US economy, leaving workers and communities with few appealing alternatives after the 
multinationals have left; (2) worse, that US MNCs may not just abandon sites in the United States but 
may actually drain capital, substitute production abroad for exports, and “hollow out” the US economy 
in a zero-sum process that damages those left behind; and (3) worst, that US MNCs may deploy a rent-
gathering apparatus that switches from sharing supranormal profits and externalities with US workers and 
communities to extracting rents from the United States.
These concerns cannot be ignored. The globalization of economic activities is no longer simply a 
function of impersonally evolving trade flows. Multinational corporations are a major force in creating 
technology, in establishing the international structure of production, in determining the location of 
high-value jobs and activities, and in dictating the consequent patterns of trade. Indeed, for the United 
States, some thirty percent of all goods exports and twenty-six percent of all services exports are intrafirm 
transactions within the confines of multinational corporations themselves (Council of Economic Advisors 
2008, 90). But do multinational investors, following their own self-interested, profit-driven strategies, 
deploy their operations in ways that are disadvantageous or harmful to the economic interests of their 
home countries, which for Samuelson and Summers means the United States? Each of the three concerns 
discussed above contains a hypothetical outcome that can be compared with contemporary evidence from 
the United States and other home countries. 
outwArd fdI And AbAndonment of the home economy
The first proposition that underlies Samuelson’s and Summers’s critique of the globalization of industry 
is that developed-country MNCs’ self-interested actions, taken without regard to their country of origin, 
lead them to abandon former sites, leaving workers and communities in their home economies bereft of 
productive activities and well-paying alternatives. This proposition has its origin in an analogy. Samuelson 
(2004) observed that in the early twentieth century the owners of textile, shoe, and other manufacturing 
plants in New England left their New England plants and set up alternative facilities in South Carolina 
and Alabama to take advantage of cheaper Southern labor. Lowell, Massachusetts and other New 
England locations were forced to turn to other industries, almost all of which were lower paying and less 
desirable than the departed textile and shoe companies. It took many decades for appealing alternatives 
to emerge, and when they did, the new industries owed nothing to the original textile, shoe, and other 
manufacturing firms that had departed.
How closely does this analogy with the move of New England manufacturing to the low-wage 
South match our evidence about outward manufacturing FDI during the contemporary period? To be 
sure, the globalization of industry via trade and investment does result in US companies relocating their 
operations abroad, as examined below. It also results in the dislocation of workers and forces communities 
to search for new industries. But US multinationals that are globalizing their economic activities also 
maintain an ongoing presence in the United States, unlike early twentieth-century New England 
manufacturing, which entirely abandoned its original communities.
A US multinational corporation is defined as a business enterprise headquartered in the United 
States that has a 10-percent ownership stake or more in at least one affiliate in another country. In 
absolute numbers, the ranks of US multinationals are rather small; less than 1 percent of all US firms, for 
a total of 2,278 US multinationals with 25,362 foreign affiliates in 2006 (Bureau of Economic Analysis 
2008a and Mataloni 2008). But US multinationals continue to have a disproportionately large economic 
impact on the US economy. They generate 20 percent of total US employment and 25 percent of total 
US output. Their operations remain overwhelmingly concentrated in the United States. In 2006 (the 
latest data available) US MNCs generated total value-added of $3.505 trillion, with more than 70 percent 
located in the United States and 30 percent abroad, while employing 21.9 million workers in the United 
States and 9.4 million abroad (BEA 2008a and Mataloni 2008). 
Over time, US multinationals have increased both employment and output in an absolute sense, 
with a slightly rising share of total US output and a slightly declining share of total US employment. In 
1982, the first year for which annual employment data were collected, US multinationals employed 18.7 
million American workers, or 25 percent of the total workforce, while by 2006 US MNCs employed 21.9 
million workers, or 19 percent of the total workforce (BEA 2008a and Mataloni 2008). In 1994, the first 
year for which annual output data were collected, the value of domestic output by US MNCs was $1.3 
trillion, or 24 percent of total private US output, while in 2006 the value of domestic output was $2.5 
trillion, or 25 percent of total private US output. In cyclical terms, US MNC output and employment 
both peaked in 2000 then started to decline, with output rebounding in 2003 and employment in 2004–
06 (BEA 2008a and Mataloni 2008). 
Between 1984 and 2004 US multinationals expanded employment in their foreign affiliates by 3.8 
million and in their home operations by 3.2 million. From 1990 to 2000 the ratio of domestic to foreign 
jobs created was particularly beneficial for the United States, as US MNCs created almost two jobs at 
home for each job created abroad. Between 2000 and 2003, however, during the downturn in the US 
business cycle after the dotcom bubble burst, US MNCs continued to expand employment abroad but 
decreased the number of jobs at home (table 1). Then, between 2004 and 2006, US MNCs returned to 
expanding payrolls both at home and abroad, adding 571,000 jobs in the United States and 830,000 jobs 
overseas (Bureau of Economic Analysis 2008a and Mataloni 2008).
When analyzing job creation, it is logical to expect that US MNCs will create jobs in line with 
the relative growth rates of the countries where they have operations. Not only does the United States 
sometimes grow more slowly than other markets, but US operations are likely to be more capital 
intensive, R&D intensive, and skill intensive—and hence fewer in number—than more labor-intensive 
production and assembly activities in the developing world. Therefore, an assessment of how US MNCs 
contribute to the US economy should not depend on whether the absolute number or growth rate of jobs 
created by US MNCs at home and abroad happen to be equal or not.
The principal contribution that US MNCs should be expected to make to the US economy is to 
reallocate economic activity in ways that raise US living standards. Here, benefits emerge in the form 
of the newer, better, cheaper, and more-reliable goods and services that US MNCs produce at home 
and import from abroad, as well as from the competition they generate in the economy more broadly. 
Another important measurement is the specific kinds of jobs and activities that US MNCs generate at 
home. The plants of US MNCs are the most productive in the United States in terms of both total factor 
productivity, which is 4.2 percent higher than at large domestic firms and 11.1 percent higher than at 
small domestic firms, and labor productivity, which is 16.6 percent higher than at large domestic firms 
and 44.6 percent higher than at small domestic firms (Doms and Jensen 1998). They are also the most 
table 1     us mnc employment (thousands of employees)
total us foreign
000 ,07 ,88 8,171
001 0,99 ,7 8,19
00 0,7 ,118 8,
00 9,7 1,10 8,
00 9,8 1,177 8,667
00 0,7 1,7 9,101
006 1, 1,78 9,97
Sources: Bureau of Economic Analysis (008a and 008b) and Mataloni (008).6
technology intensive, using more technologies from the Survey of Manufacturing Technology’s list of 17 
advanced manufacturing technologies than do large or small domestic firms, and they pay wages that are 
7–15 percent higher than at comparable domestic plants (Richardson 2005a, 113).2 In 2006 US MNCs 
accounted for 31 percent of all US private-sector investment and 76 percent of all US private-sector 
R&D. In addition to the high productivity, high value-added, high wage activities undertaken directly 
by US MNCs in the United States, US MNCs purchase large amounts of goods and services from US 
suppliers and account for a sizable amount of US exports. In 2006 US MNC purchases from US firms 
amounted to $5 trillion, almost 90 percent of all their purchases. In the same year US MNCs exported 
goods from the United States valued at $532 billion, 51 percent of all US goods exports (Mataloni 2008, 
4). Of these, $203 billion, or 38 percent, were shipped directly from US plants to their sister affiliates 
abroad.
In short, far from supporting Samuelson’s “abandonment” hypothesis, US multinationals continue 
to make large and growing contributions to the US economy even as they move outward from the 
United States. These beneficial home-country effects of multinational corporations are not limited to US 
corporations. Rugman (2005) found that of the 500 largest MNCs from the United States, Europe, and 
Asia, 320 average 80 percent of their sales in their own home region.3
The globalization of industry also brings investment into the United States from foreign 
multinationals at the same time that US multinationals engage in outward investment, a phenomenon 
that was not present when manufacturers abandoned New England in the early twentieth century. In 
2004 the US affiliates of foreign MNCs owned $5.5 trillion in assets, produced $515 billion of goods 
and services within the United States, and accounted for 5.7 percent of total US private output, up from 
3.8 percent in 1988 (Council of Economic Advisors 2007). The US affiliates of foreign MNCs employed 
5.1 million workers, 4.7 percent of the US workforce in 2004, up from 3.6 percent in 1988. They also 
accounted for 19 percent of US exports, 10 percent of physical capital expenditures, and 13 percent of 
R&D expenditures (Bernard, Jensen, and Schott 2005).
In terms of raising US living standards by improving access to good jobs, foreign-owned plants in 
the United States are more capital intensive, more productive, use a higher proportion of nonproduction 
workers, and pay higher wages than the average US-owned plant (Doms and Jensen 1998). Controlling 
for industry, size, plant age, and state, foreign-owned plants in the United States still show better 
operating characteristics than domestically owned plants. Foreign-owned plants pay wages 2.5–7 percent 
higher than at comparable domestic plants (Richardson 2005a). The performance of the US affiliates of 
foreign MNCs is second only to the performance of the US plants of US MNCs.
2. Information on the Survey of Manufacturing Technology can be found at www.census.gov/econ/. 
3. Rugman (2005) reported that these 500 largest MNCs account for more than 90 percent of the world’s stock of 
FDI, but did not provide more detail on these stocks or flows.7
The inflows of foreign investment into the United States constitute an important channel for 
technology spillovers to domestic companies, especially in high-tech sectors. Keller and Yeaple (2008) 
calculated that 8–19 percent of all productivity growth among US firms between 1987 and 1996 was 
the result of the growing presence of foreign investors in the US economy. The positive impact was 
disproportionately large in high-tech sectors, namely chemicals, computers and office equipment, 
electronic components, scientific instruments, and medical instruments. A good example of the 
contributions made by the US affiliates of foreign MNCs to the US economy is the Chevrolet Volt, a 
plug-in hybrid that GM considers an important part of its plans to turn the company around. At the 
opening of the 2009 North American International Auto Show the Governor of Michigan marched with 
cheering GM employees alongside the Volt, waving signs reading “We’re electric” on one side and “Here 
to stay” on the other.4 One of the keys to the success of the Volt is its lithium-ion polymer battery, the 
contract for which was awarded to LC Chemicals of Korea. LC Chemicals will ship battery cells from 
Korea and build the battery packs themselves at its Compact Power affiliate assembly plant in Troy, 
Michigan.5 In 2008 Mohamed Alamgir, director of research at Compact Power, and Anne Marie Sastry, 
professor of mechanical, biomedical, and materials science and engineering at the University of Michigan 
won the Trevor O. Jones Outstanding Paper Award for their research comparing alternative battery 
technologies for the transportation sector. GM and LC Chemicals successfully tested the latter’s cells in 
the Chevrolet Volt prototype at the Ochang TechnoPark, two hours south of Seoul, Korea. To supply 
the Volt after it is launched, GM has also announced plans to build its own battery plant, relying on the 
technology and production experience gained from its association with LC Chemicals. 
Turning to US exports, the majority of US goods exports are manufactured within MNC networks. 
In 2005 goods exported by US MNCs, by the US affiliates of foreign MNCs, and by unaffiliated US 
companies to the foreign affiliates of US MNCs amounted to $621 billion, or 69 percent of all US goods 
exports (Council of Economic Advisors 2008, 90). Of this total, US MNCs exported $416 billion, and 
the US affiliates of foreign MNCs exported $169 billion, jointly accounting for 65 percent of total US 
goods exports. Almost half of these exports consisted of intrafirm trade within multinational networks: 
Goods exported from US MNCs to their foreign affiliates and from the US affiliates of foreign MNCs to 
their parent companies totaled $267 billion, 30 percent of all US goods exports. 
Multinationals also play a large and growing role in the export of services. Services exports from US 
MNCs to their foreign affiliates and from the US affiliates of foreign MNCs to their parent companies 
totaled $103 billion in 2006, 26 percent of all US private services exports, and accounted for almost 
one third of the growth in US private services exports over the previous decade (Council of Economic 
4. Kendra Marr, “GM Puts a Charge in Auto Show,” Washington Post, January 13, 2009.
5. LC Chemicals also has a US affiliate that manufactures industrial materials in Adairsville, Georgia.8
Advisors 2008, 90). The United States shows a strong comparative advantage in the export of high-
wage, high-skill services, and US MNCs and the US affiliates of foreign MNCs are likely to remain an 
important channel for exploiting this comparative advantage (Jensen and Kletzer 2008).
Thus the globalization of industry in the contemporary period leaves the United States with a high-
performance, high-productivity, high value-added core that exploits the evolving comparative advantages 
of the United States. To be sure, these activities may be located in different sites from before—in Raleigh-
Durham, Austin, Palo Alto, and Seattle rather than in Detroit, Gary, and Toledo—and the costs of churn 
and displacement are no less real in the contemporary period than they were a century ago. But public 
concern and public policy should concentrate on dealing with these genuine burdens of displacement 
rather than on inaccurate and misleading analogies with twentieth-century manufacturing in New 
England.
outwArd fdI, runAwAy PlAnts, And lost cAPItAl
The second testable proposition in Samuelson’s and Summers’s critiques of globalization envisions a fate 
worse than abandonment, namely that outward investment by US multinationals substitutes external 
production for exports, drains off capital, and “hollows out” the US economy in a zero-sum process 
that damages those left behind. This proposition contains two distinct assertions: first, that outward 
investment by US MNCs replaces exports that would have been produced by US plants with external 
production; and second, that outward investment by US MNCs siphons off capital, replacing investment 
that would have been made in the United States. The common theme to these two assertions is that 
outward investment by US MNCs is a win-lose phenomenon that harms the US economy. 
The concern that US MNCs would use production abroad to substitute for exports that otherwise 
would have been manufactured in the United States has a long and venerable history, beginning with the 
Burke-Hartke legislation (sponsored by the AFL-CIO) in the 1970s and culminating, at least rhetorically, 
in Ross Perot’s “great sucking sound” claim about NAFTA (Bergsten, Horst, and Moran 1978). But does 
the evidence from the United States and other developed countries show that MNC production abroad 
actually substitutes for exports that otherwise would have been produced in the home economy? 
To determine the answer, it is crucial to look closely at the counterfactual—what would happen in 
the home economy if the MNC did not make the outward investment—both to evaluate the substitution 
hypothesis and to assess the often-suggested policy proposal of making it more expensive and difficult for 
MNCs to build plants abroad. A pioneer in the testing of the substitution-hypothesis was Thomas Horst 
(Bergsten, Horst, and Moran 1978, chapter 3). Subsequent analysis has grown increasingly sophisticated; 
but reviewing Horst’s approach is particularly useful since his methodology permits clear assessment of 
the counterfactual outcome of no outward investment by MNCs. To conduct a fair test, it is not enough 9
to simply acknowledge that MNCs invest more at home and export more from home plants than the 
typical home-country firm. As Host noted, MNCs are not typical or average: They are larger, conduct 
more R&D, engage in more advertising, and have other characteristics that set them apart. MNCs should 
be expected to do even more investment at home or engage in even more exporting from home plants. 
To discover, then, whether US MNCs substitute production abroad for exports from the United States, 
we should compare “likes with likes”—that is, we must compare the export behavior of large firms, firms 
with high R&D spending, and firms with extensive advertising that undertake outward investment with 
the export behavior of comparable firms that do not undertake outward investment.
The table constructed from Horst’s data (table 2) goes beyond this. The table compares the export 
behavior (exports as a percentage of domestic shipments) of similar firms using four measurements: the 
export performance of firms that do not invest abroad (first column), the export performance of firms 
that engage in minimal outward investment (second column), the export performance of firms with 
substantial outward investment (third column), and the export performance of firms that have thoroughly 
globalized their production (fourth column).
This set of like-with-like comparisons demonstrates that US firms that undertake outward 
investment actually achieve higher levels of exports as a percentage of domestic shipments than firms 
that stay at home in the United States. This superior export performance, a demonstration of superior 
competitiveness in the face of global pressures, increases as they further globalize their operations. The 
percentage of domestic shipments that leave the home market for external markets rises as MNCs engage 
in greater international investment.6 This demonstrates that outward investment by US MNCs enhances 
6. The exact relationship in the fourth column is somewhat murky in these data, but subsequent statistical analyses, 
discussed below, show a positive correlation between greater international investment and exports as a percentage of 
domestic shipments. 
table 2     export performance of particular types of industries by foreign investment levels  
  (exports as percentage of domestic shipments)
foreign investment
type of industry
least amount or 
none
low to middle 
range
middle to middle 
range most
High tech . 7.8 9.7 7.6
Low tech 1. .0 . .
High advertising 1 .8 . .6
Low advertising 1. .8 7. 7.7
High unionization 1.9 . . .8
Low unionization 1. . 7 7.8
Note:  More recent data are cited below; these statistics are introduced to illustrate the methodology and the counterfactual. 
Source:  Adapted from Bergsten, Horst, and Moran (1978), 81-8, table -.10
the competitiveness of their US operations in comparison with similar firms that do not undertake 
outward investment or that do not undertake as much outward investment. Outward investment is a 
complement to greater production at home, not a substitute for it.
Most important, these comparisons provide a clear picture of the counterfactual: What would the 
situation in the US economy be if US MNCs did not engage in outward investment at all or did not 
engage in outward investment so extensively? The performance of firms in columns 2, 3, and 4 would 
more closely resemble the performance of their peers in column 1. This shows that staying at home does 
not strengthen the US industrial base or lead to greater US exports from home. On the contrary, this 
option leads to a less-competitive industrial base in the United States and fewer exports from the United 
States. If US MNCs were prevented from investing abroad or if obstacles and disincentives were put in 
their path, the United States would be weaker and the labor market would contain fewer export-related 
jobs. Somewhat surprisingly, this positive relationship between outward investment and exports holds for 
US low-tech (i.e., low R&D) industries just as for US high-tech industries and for heavily unionized US 
industries just as for nonunionized US industries. Outward investment creates more export-related jobs in 
the US economy for low-tech workers and for unionized workers, just as it does for US workers overall, in 
comparison with US firms with similar workers that do not engage in outward investment.
Subsequent studies, relying on more-sophisticated statistical techniques, have consistently 
demonstrated the complementarity between MNC outward investment and exports from a more-
competitive industrial base at home. Lipsey and Weiss (1981) found a positive correlation, after 
controlling for firm characteristics, between outward investment and exports for all levels of investment. 
They also discovered that the level of manufacturing activity by US firms in a given country was positively 
associated with US exports from the same industries to that country and negatively associated with 
exports to that country by producers of rival nationalities. Along the same lines, they noted that the 
presence of foreign multinationals in a given country was negatively correlated with US exports to that 
country and positively correlated with foreign countries’ exports. In a somewhat mercantilistic vein, they 
concluded that direct investment by US MNCs in any one country tended to increase US exports to and 
US market shares in that country and to reduce those of producers of rival nationalities, while foreign 
MNCs’ operations tended to raise their countries’ exports and market shares and to reduce those of US 
firms. A smaller US MNC presence outside of the United States would reduce US exports to and market 
share in other countries. Lipsey and Weiss’s counterfactual outcome was the same as Horst’s: Reducing 
the outward investment of home-country MNCs would hurt the access of home-country workers to 
export-related jobs. A later study by Lipsey and Weiss (1984) showed that the complementarity between 
outward investment and exports was strong not only for intermediate goods sent abroad for further 
processing but also for the exports of finished products shipped by parent US firms. This same study also 11
found that higher proportions of foreign operations on the part of US firms were associated with higher 
average compensation at home.
This complementarity is not unique to US MNCs. When Swedish MNCs were subjected 
to criticisms from domestic labor, Bloomström, Lipsey, and Kulchyck (1988) found a similar 
complementary relationship between outward investment on the part of Swedish MNCs and Swedish 
exports and employment. Outward investment by Japanese MNCs shows similar effects on the Japanese 
economy (Lipsey, Ramsterrer, and Blomström 2000). The complementarity is almost as great for 
manufacturing as it is for distribution: Head and Ries (2001) calculated that a 10 percent rise in FDI 
abroad in manufacturing and distribution would increase exports from home plants in Japan by 1.2 
percent and 1.5 percent, respectively. More recent studies have confirmed that the relationship between 
outward investment and home-country exports is predominantly complementary (Markusen and Maskus 
2003). When labor substitution does show up in the data, it is almost entirely limited to competition 
between alternative low-wage locations in the developing world rather than vertically between parents and 
their affiliates in lesser-developed regions (Brainard and Riker 1997). 
Turning now to the contention that outward investment on the part of US MNCs “drains 
off” capital that otherwise would have been invested in the United States, the evidence also suggests 
complementarity rather than zero-sum dynamics in parent-MNC strategy. Desai, Foley, and Hines 
(2005) discovered that years in which American multinational firms made greater capital expenditures 
abroad coincided with greater capital spending by the same firms in the United States. But the correlation 
between the domestic and foreign growth rates of multinational firms may be due to other reasons than 
an interaction between operations in both locales—a pharmaceutical company may discover a new drug 
or a software company may develop a new process that leads to simultaneous increases in activity at home 
and abroad. So Desai, Foley, and Hines (2005) used an instrumental variable that would predict foreign 
investment but not directly affect domestic operations. Their instrumental variable is a firm-specific 
weighted average of foreign GDP growth, which can be used to forecast the growth rates of foreign 
investment made by the multinational. These predicted growth rates in turn can be traced back in order 
to possibly explain related changes in home-country activity by the multinational. Using this procedure, 
they found that 10 percent greater foreign investment by the multinational triggers 2.2 percent additional 
domestic investment. They have also showed similar positive relationships between foreign investment 
and home-country exports, R&D spending, numbers of employees, and employee compensation (Desai, 
Foley, and Hines forthcoming). 
The evidence suggests that outward investment is an integral part of MNC strategy to maximize 
the competitive position of the corporation as a whole, a goal for which headquarters raises the needed 
amount of capital from sources all around the globe. In determining where to deploy capital and where to 1
locate production, relative costs, including relative wages and benefits as well as relative skills and relative 
productivity, play a definite role, but in the end operations at home and operations abroad complement 
each other, as the MNC parent tries to deploy tangible and intangible assets in the most productive and 
most profitable way possible. As pointed out earlier, US MNC plants accounted for 51 percent of all US 
goods exports in 2006, of which 38 percent were shipped directly to overseas affiliates of the US parent.
The finding that firms engaging in outward FDI export more from their domestic market than 
similar firms not engaging in outward investment bears directly on the composition of good and bad jobs 
in the home-country market, since export-related jobs across all developed countries offer a wage and 
benefit premium in comparison with jobs in comparable firms. In the United States export jobs pay wages 
10–11 percent higher than nonexport-related jobs (Richardson 2005a). Thus outward investment by US 
MNCs results in a higher proportion of US jobs with relatively high wages and benefits compared with 
jobs with lower wages and benefits.
The benefits that accrue to US companies that engage in outward investment are not limited to their 
superior export performance. US MNCs that invest abroad use frontier production processes in their US 
plants more frequently, have higher levels of worker productivity, and enjoy more-rapid growth rates of 
overall productivity than firms that do not invest abroad (Bernard, Jensen, and Schott 2005). US firms 
that engage in outward investment pay their blue-collar production workers 7–15 percent more than 
comparable firms that do not invest abroad: 7 percent more in large US MNC plants and 15 percent 
more in small US MNC plants (Richardson 2005b). Given their higher productivity, US firms that 
invest abroad enjoy lower levels of bankruptcy and are less likely to suffer job losses than similar firms 
that do not engage in outward investment. This outcome makes intuitive sense, but contrasts strongly 
with conventional wisdom: Contrary to popular perception, outward investment by US MNCs leads to a 
more-stable job base at home. 
To be sure, these findings do not imply that the domestic industrial sector from which the outward 
investment originates is always expanding on a net basis. What is striking, however, is that US firms that 
engage in outward investment offer better prospects for their workers than firms that do not in both 
expanding and contracting industries. Home-country companies in contracting sectors that are globally 
engaged, to use Richardson’s characterization—importing, exporting, engaging in outward investment, 
or connected to inward investors—are the most successful participants in those sectors. Across sectors, 
whether expanding or declining, the superior benefits associated with globally engaged firms accrue 
to average-skilled as well as high-skilled workers, to union members as well as nonunion workers, to 
minorities, and to those who live in small towns as well as large urban areas.
A good example of this result in a declining sector is the family history of “Pam’s family” that 
Lewis and Richardson (2001) traced through five generations. Pam’s great-grandmother, grandmother, 1
and mother worked as seamstresses in Cumberland, Maryland, for minimum wage. Pam herself worked 
her way up from sewing to customer service at the Schwab garment company, responsible for the Ralph 
Lauren line of children’s clothes, via computer courses at a local community college. Over the course of 
the 1990s, the total number of jobs at Schwab remained remarkably constant (unusually for this sector), 
but their composition changed as sewing and cutting moved offshore and were replaced with marketing, 
distribution, and business-service occupations. As of 2001, Pam supervised five managers and eighteen 
contract supervisors with the task of ensuring that the correct bar codes, labels, and prices arrived on time 
at their destinations around the globe. Pam’s son, meanwhile, became a manager at Schwab’s distribution 
center in Martinsburg, West Virginia. Both Pam and her son enjoyed wages and benefits, and profit 
sharing, that placed the family more squarely in the middle class than her grandmother or great-
grandmother could have ever achieved.
The more-frequent story for declining industries may involve net job losses. Between 2002 and 
2006 North Carolina lost some 72,000 manufacturing jobs, concentrated in textiles and furniture 
fabrication (Kletzer, Levinsohn, and Richardson 2007). To replace these jobs, North Carolina partnered 
with newly arrived businesses to design courses for the state’s community college network to provide the 
skills their workforce would need.7 A state recruitment director singled out Regina Whitaker as a model 
for their effort. In 1996, just out of high school, Regina took a job at the same yarn texturing plant 
where her mother had worked for three decades. As that company relocated labor-intensive production 
operations to China and Brazil, workers in the Piedmont region were laid off. In 2003 Regina enrolled 
in biotechnology classes at Forsyth Technical Community College, and on graduating was hired as 
a lab technician in Targacept, a biotech firm in Winston-Salem, with a salary that she reported was 
“significantly more” than she had earned at the yarn factory. Between 1996 and 2003 the number of 
workers in biosciences in the region increased from 20,000 to 47,000. 
Looking at companies that remained within the North Carolina textile sector, Richardson’s global 
engagement rule—that even in declining industries there may be international opportunities for US firms, 
workers, and communities—finds support. As Glen Raven lost out in the struggle to sell nylon pantyhose 
from its Piedmont plant, the US parent shifted to producing and weaving high-grade industrial yarn 
used in upholstery.8 These more capital-intensive operations led to downsizing, reducing the number of 
employees from 225 to 156, but compensation rose from $10.50 to $22 per hour. The largest destination 
for Glen Raven’s exports from North Carolina became China, and these increased fivefold between 2003 
and 2006 to $52 million per year. Although Glen Raven has not yet invested abroad as other successful 
high-end US textile firms have, the company’s story illustrates the more-general finding that even in 
7. Peter S. Goodman, “In N.C., A Second Industrial Revolution,” Washington Post, September 3, 2007.
8. Peter S. Goodman, “In N.C., A Second Industrial Revolution,” Washington Post, September 3, 2007.1
declining industries there may be international opportunities that provide benefits to firms, workers, and 
communities.
Turning now to middle-skill industrial sectors, where the United States has historically had 
worldwide comparative advantage but now faces increasing international competition: Rather than 
asking whether aggregate employment has expanded or contracted, we should instead ask what would 
have happened if US companies were hindered or restricted from investing abroad. One of the best 
selling and most successful trucks in the world has historically been Ford’s F-150 series. In 2004–05 Ford 
fundamentally redesigned the F-150 line, making the Ford Essex Engine Plant in Windsor, Canada the 
exclusive source of the F-150’s engine and choosing Ford’s contract manufacturer, IMMSA of Monterey, 
Mexico as the sole supplier of its chassis, using cheaper Mexican steel alloy. Ford’s prospects for holding 
its share of the truck market vis-à-vis the Toyota Tacoma, the Isuzu DMax, and the Chrysler Dodge 
Ram, as well as the fate of UAW workers at Ford’s US assembly facilities, depend in part on this NAFTA-
integrated supply chain. Despite the United Auto Workers’ (UAW) visceral condemnation of NAFTA, 
the fate of UAW workers at Ford’s US assembly facilities depend upon the North American trade-and-
investment agreement.
Finally, the disc drive industry represents a sector where US multinationals demonstrate ongoing 
prowess along the international frontier. Seagate is the world’s leading provider of hard disc drives 
on the basis of both revenue and units shipped, with approximately 45 percent of the global market 
(McKendrick, Donner, and Haggard 2000).9 Seagate products are found in computers, digital video 
recorders, video game consoles, portable media players, and automotive navigation systems. For fiscal 
years 2006, 2007, and 2008 approximately 30 percent of Seagate’s disc drive revenue came from 
customers located in North America, with approximately 27 percent coming from customers in Europe 
and approximately 43 percent from customers in Asia. Hewlett Packard and Dell each account for 
approximately 10 percent of Seagate’s revenue, Lenovo less. Sony PlayStation 3 and Microsoft Xbox are 
the largest buyers for video game consoles.
Seagate has management, R&D, and design facilities in California (Sunnyvale and Scotts Valley), 
Massachusetts (Shrewsbury), Minnesota (Minneapolis), Colorado (Longmont), Pennsylvania (Pittsburg), 
Oklahoma (Oklahoma City), and Singapore. The company’s principal, wholly owned manufacturing 
facilities are located in China, Malaysia, Northern Ireland, Singapore, Thailand, and, in the United 
States, in California and Minnesota. Seagate’s worldwide employment was 45,000 in 2008, with 8,000 
managers, engineers, and other staff in the United States and 37,000 abroad, mostly production-line 
personnel.
Across the spectrum of specific uses, disc drives have an extremely short production life-cycle. 
Two months before the introduction of each new model, Seagate brings three or four dozen local line-
9. Seagate Corporation, 2008, Annual Report, Form 10-K, available at www.seagate.com (accessed on July 6, 2009).1
operators and supervisors from Thailand, Malaysia, China, and Singapore to the United States to work 
with product developers and manufacturing specialists (McKendrick, Donner, and Haggard 2000). The 
combined “new product transfer team,” including American experts, then returns to Asia to set up the 
new production run, remaining in place until high capacity and low rejection rates are achieved. Seagate’s 
competitive position in world markets and its 8,000 relatively high-compensation employees in the 
United States depend on this tight integration between home-country and overseas facilities. Seagate’s 
principal competitors are Fujitsu, Hitachi, Toshiba, Samsung, GS Magicstor in Japan, and Western 
Digital in the United States. 
Overall, as some sectors expand and other sectors contract there will surely be job losses and 
dislocations for some workers, while others gain new opportunities. Indeed Bernard and Jensen (2007) 
have showed that once favorable plant characteristics such as size, plant age, and the employment of 
skilled labor are controlled for, US MNC-owned plants are more likely to close, justifying anxiety on 
the part of their better treated workers. Multinational firms simply have more readily available margins 
to adjust than nonmultinationals: They can make changes in the mix of technology, marketing, and 
supplier inputs more easily than nonmultinationals and can respond to changes in market conditions 
more rapidly. They embody attributes that are extraordinarily valuable to the domestic economy 
(frontier practices, large scale operations, superior jobs) that nonmultinationals possess less often, but 
accompanying these attributes are more-rapid mechanisms for adjustment. 
Changing patterns of MNC investment, like changing patterns of technology deployment more 
generally, contribute to job losses and dislocations for some workers as well as to new opportunities for 
others. The appropriate response for home-country authorities is to design adjustment and retraining 
programs to cushion the impact on those adversely affected, not to impede capital flows and engage in a 
futile effort to preserve jobs in uncompetitive home-country economic activities.10
outwArd Investment, strAteGIc trAde theory, And the cAPture of “rents” 
AbroAd
The third testable proposition in Samuelson’s and Summers’s critiques of globalization embodies the most 
nightmarish scenario of all: that US MNCs may switch from sharing supranormal profits and externalities 
with US workers and communities to extracting rents from the United States. The theory behind FDI 
is that companies take the trouble to build plants and coordinate activities across borders, rather than 
simply selling products or licensing technology, because they possess intangible assets that afford them 
higher profits when they maintain control over all operations. FDI takes place only in industries where 
10. For an agenda of retraining and adjustment policies for the United States, see Kletzer and Rosen (2005) and 
Rosen (2008).16
markets are not perfectly competitive. The presumption is that successful multinational corporations 
can collect rents from their activities, some of which may be shared with their workers and generate 
externalities that benefit countries where their operations are located.
The United States may not “necessarily benefit from the economic success of its trading partners,” 
argued Larry Summers, if the economies of those trading partners are powered by multinational 
corporations, thereby shifting rent collection to the new host states.11 “Stateless elites whose allegiance is 
to global economic success and their own prosperity rather than the interests of the nation where they 
are headquartered” may share rents and externalities formerly captured by US workers and communities 
with external workers and communities in new locations. Similarly, Paul Samuelson (2004) observed: 
“Historically, US workers used to have kind of a de facto monopoly access to the US’s superlative capital 
and know-how (scientific, engineering and managerial). All of us Yankees, so to speak, were born with 
silver spoons in our mouths.” Perhaps multinational corporate investment is now offering monopoly 
access, and silver spoons, to non-Yankees.
A first look at the evidence supports apprehension about possible rent-shifting. Popular outrage 
about sweatshops and the possible abuse of workers often leaves the impression that multinational 
manufacturing and assembly investors predominantly engage in labor-intensive operations consisting 
primarily of low-skilled, low-wage jobs. But the data paint a quite different picture (Moran 
forthcoming). The vast majority of manufacturing FDI flows to middle-skilled industrial sectors in 
developing countries rather than to garment, footwear, and other low-skilled operations, and the already 
higher growth of more skill-intensive investor operations is speeding up over time. As table 3 shows, the 
flow of manufacturing FDI to medium-skilled activities, such as transportation equipment, industrial 
machinery, electronics and electrical products, chemicals, rubber, and plastic products, is nearly ten 
times larger each year than the flow to low-skilled, labor-intensive operations. This shift toward more-
sophisticated activities has grown in recent decades. The ratio between higher- and lower-skill activities 
was roughly five to one in the period of 1989–91, but almost ten to one in the period of 2004–06. If the 
stock of manufacturing FDI is used instead of the flow, roughly the same results obtain: a ratio of seven 
to one in 1990, a ratio of ten to one in 2006. Moreover, these ratios are probably understated, because 
data on FDI stocks typically do not provide accurate information on reinvested earnings or make 
allowances for accelerated depreciation, both of which are particularly pronounced in more capital-
intensive, higher-skilled FDI operations.
Survey data from industrial sectors such as autos and auto equipment, electronics, chemicals, and 
industrial equipment in comparison with garments and footwear show that foreign investors in higher-
11. Lawrence Summers, “America needs to make a new case for trade,” Financial Times, April 27, 2008.17
skilled activities pay their workers two to three times as much for basic production jobs, and perhaps ten 
times as much for technical and supervisory positions, as what is earned by employees in comparable 
positions in lower-skilled MNC operations. Thus the globalization of industry around the world via 
FDI in manufacturing expands the opportunities available to medium- and higher-skilled workers in 
developing countries. It is therefore plausible to argue that auto workers and managers at MNC plants 
in Mexico and Brazil, or electronics workers and managers at MNC plants in Malaysia and Thailand, 
or workers at Intel’s semiconductor plant in Costa Rica, who earn 150 percent of the average national 
manufacturing wage, are able to partake of the rents associated with their employers in ways that only US 
workers and managers were able to thirty years ago. But other evidence tempers this conclusion. Lawrence 
(1996, 82–84), expanding on work first done by Katz and Summers, has shown that from 1978 through 
1990 average rents earned by production workers and managers in US manufacturing have not changed 
much. Moreover, Lawrence reminds us, most trade in high-rent sectors takes place among developed 
countries; trade involving developing countries typically involves low-rent sectors.
Could this be changing? The data presented above showing FDI taking place predominantly 
in higher-skilled rather than in the lowest-skilled activities suggest that it may be. But this evolution 
probably fits better with Vernon’s (1966) product-cycle model of gradual dispersion of middle-skilled 
assembly operations than with Brander and Spencer’s (1981) strategic trade model of one highest-rent, 
highest-externality location abruptly replacing another. These FDI activities are not the “commanding 
heights” of highest-rent strategic trade industries and do not appear to be heading in that direction very 
rapidly (Krugman 1986).
In the case of China, where concerns about FDI helping to create a new technological superstate 
are highest (Preeg 2008), multinational corporate investment helped to propel a substantial shift between 
1992 and 2005 from agriculture and apparel manufacturing to electronics and machinery manufacturing, 
including computers, telecom equipment, electrical machinery, and office machines. These latter sectors 
are considerably more sophisticated and skill intensive than the former (Rodrick 2006). But the data 
table 3     manufacturing mnc operations in developing countries






(annual average) 1990 1999 2006
Lower-skilled sectors ,860  ,100  9,6  19,88  6,86  6,1 
Higher-skilled sectors 1,70  ,800  9,818  1,686  0,98  6,77 
Note: For a complete breakdown by sector, see Annex I (FDI flows) and Annex II (FDI stocks) from the UNCTAD database in Moran 
(forthcoming). 
Source: Moran (forthcoming).18
show that this outcome is largely due to the increased skill content of inputs from Taiwan, Japan, and the 
United States that are then assembled within China for export. Leaving aside the duty-free intermediates 
that make up the final electronic and machinery products, Lardy (2005) and Amiti and Freund (2008) 
observed that it is not clear that there has been a significant change in the skill content of China’s own 
processing activities.
As for the possibility of extracting rents from US consumers or generating adverse terms of trade 
for the United States, the evidence shows just the opposite: the average prices of goods exported from 
China to the United States fell by an average of 1.5 percent per year between 1997 and 2005 (Amiti and 
Freund 2008). Schott (2006) found that while China exports more products in common with OECD 
countries than would be expected given the country’s level of development (largely due to the benefits 
of FDI), Chinese exports sell for a substantial discount relative to OECD varieties of the same product. 
The reason seems to be that quality upgrades in each product category take place more rapidly within 
OECD countries than within China. At the end of the day, the data show no more than that US workers 
and managers may be less unique in their ability to extract rents from outsiders, rather than revealing 
that multinational investment has allowed foreign workers and managers to develop some new, powerful 
ability to extract rents from Americans.
conclusIons And PolIcy ImPlIcAtIons
The analysis presented here shows that the globalization of industry and services via FDI may well be, 
as Lori Wallach has said, trade on steroids. But the pejorative connotations associated with this phrase 
are almost entirely inaccurate empirically. To be sure, FDI generates losers as well as winners. But 
multinational corporations do not spread technology and capital in ways that harm the aggregate interests 
of workers in developed countries. Multinational corporations do not locate their operations in a zero-
sum manner that favors host economies at the expense of the home economy. The two-way flow of 
inward and outward investment does not result in anything like a “hollowing out” of the home economy.
Outward FDI from the United States, or from other home countries, is understandably the 
most controversial phenomenon. Multinational corporations do close plants at home and build plants 
abroad, and these firms demonstrably threaten workers during labor negotiations that they will ship 
jobs overseas if the workers ask for too much. But the evidence consistently shows that the expansion 
of MNC operations abroad and the strengthening of MNC operations in their home countries are 
complementary, and the answer to the counterfactual—would the home country or home-country 
workers be better off, if home-country MNCs were prevented from engaging in outward investment—is 
over and over again negative. Of particular note is the empirical support for Richardson’s observation 
that outward FDI takes place in both declining and ascendant industries, but in both kinds of industries 19
firms that are globally engaged, including involved in FDI, show superior performance to their 
counterparts that are not.
President Obama has pledged that his administration will end tax breaks for corporations that 
ship jobs overseas. At the center of this proposal is an end of deferral for US multinationals. At first 
glance, the evidence presented above would appear to support such a position, as it seems to reinforce 
the “classical” conclusion that countries should try to equalize the tax burden on foreign and domestic 
income so that multinationals make investment decisions based entirely on commercial considerations 
not tax concerns—i.e., capital export neutrality.12 But while capital export neutrality ostensibly 
justifies the elimination of deferral, the latest assessments by Hufbauer suggest that this would be 
counterproductive: US tax policy already places US multinational operations in the United States at 
a competitive disadvantage vis-à-vis rival multinationals.13 Hufbauer and Kim (2009) recommended 
that the US tax regime be shifted toward a territorial system, coupled with favorable expense allocation 
rules: The United States would tax all income earned at home, but would not tax active business income 
earned abroad. 
The data introduced here show that it would be unwise in the extreme to make the United States 
a less-favorable setting from which to conduct international business activities. Today US multinational 
corporations concentrate more than 70 percent of their operations here in the United States, constituting 
the most technology-intensive and productive segment of the American economy and offering higher 
wages and benefits than other companies as a result. They now conduct more than three quarters of all 
US private-sector R&D. 
Using the US economy as the base for integrating their global operations, which includes engaging 
in outward investment, strengthens the domestic operations of US MNCs and allows them to generate 
more exports (and thus more higher-paying, export-related jobs) than firms that do not engage in 
outward investment. Making it more difficult to engage in outward investment would not strengthen the 
US economy. Quite the contrary, placing obstacles in the way of US multinationals’ global operations 
would leave them and their suppliers, their workers, and the communities where their US facilities are 
located worse off and less competitive in the world economy.
12. Bergsten, Horst, and Moran (1978) calculated that US tax policy was closer to capital export neutrality than 
commonly supposed. Deferral gave outward investment only a small advantage, which was offset by the denial of the 
US investment tax credit and ADR acceleration of depreciation.
13. Gary Clyde Hufbauer, “The President’s Proposals to Tax Corporate Income Earned Abroad Are Bad for US Jobs 
and Exports,” Real Time Economic Issues Watch, May 5th, 2009, available at www.piie.com (accessed on July 6, 
2009).0
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